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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's
March

27,

alleging

1992

entitlement

compensation
accident.

Order

benefits

Denying
to

Petitioner's

permanent,

sustained

total

Motion

for

disability

as a result

of

an

Review

workers'
industrial

A Petition for Review of that Order was timely filed

with this Court on April 24, 1992.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
There are three substantial issues presented for review:
(1)

whether an injured worker who is injured at work during

a period of time when he is attempting to return to substantial,
gainful employment is entitled to recieve workers

compensation

benefits occasioned by his industrial injury;
(2)

whether an injured worker so injured

permanent, total disability

is entitled to

compensation where he was

in fact

gainfully employed at the time of his industrial injury, and is
unable

to

return

or

meaningfully

attempt

to

return

to

work

following his industrial injury; and,
(3)

whether an injured workers ability to work in gainful

employment at the time of his industrial injury demonstrates as a
matter of law that he is not permanently and totally disabled at
1

the time of his industrial injury.
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to
the agency's view of the law is required.
Procedures
(1988).
1991).

Act, Utah

Code Annotated,

Utah Administrative

Section

63-46b-16(4)

(d)

Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah

State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner.

State

Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984).

McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah

1977) .

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah Code Annotated,

Section 35-1-67 (5) (b) (1991) is the

determinative statute in this case.

Industrial Commission Rule

R568-1-17 of the Utah Administrative Rules is also applicable.
They are each set forth in full in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
2

Mr. Abel

seeks review of the Industrial

Commission

Order

denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to
workers'

compensation

benefits

occasioned

by

his

industrial

accident.
Course of Proceedings
On November

21, 1990 Petitioner

filed an Application

for

permanent, total disability benefits alleging that as the result of
his March 22, 1989 industrial injury he was no longer able to work.
(R. at

5) .

Respondents

alleged

that

Mr. Abel's

industrial

accident did not cause his permanent, total disability status.
at 120).

(R.

A formal hearing was held before an Administrative Law

Judge on March 12, 1991. (R. at 12).
Disposition Below
On October 3, 1991, The Administrative Law Judge found that
there was no causal connection between the industrial accident and
the Petitioner's permanent, total disability status. His clciim for
permanent, total disability benefits was dismissed with prejudiced.
(R. at 53-65, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B ) .
Mr.

Abel

filed

a Motion

for

Review

with

the

Industrial

Commission which was subsequently denied on March 27, 1992.
119-122, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C ) .

(R. at

He challenges

that final agency action in this Petition for Review.
Statement of the Facts
The relevant facts in this matter are not in dispute.
On March 22, 1989, the Petitioner experienced an industrial
injury to his lower back while employed by West Jordan Care Center.
3

(R. at 57) . Five years previously, Mr. Abel had been found totally
disabled by the Social Security Administration and was awarded
federal disability payments.

(R. at 145).

Notwithstanding his

Social Security's determination of his disability, he reentered the
work force and had been working 3 2 hours a week for several weeks
prior to his industrial injury.

(R. at 32) .

He was unable to

returned to work after his industrial injury (R. at 40, 41), and
was found to be unsuitable for vocational rehabilitation due to his
age

(over 57 years old); education

history

(punch

press, dye

set-up

(into the 11th grade); work
and

truck

severity of his overall medical condition.
The

Medical

Panel

report,

which

driver);

and

the

by

the

(R. at 60).
was

adopted

Administrative Law Judge, found that as a direct result of the
industrial

accident,

impairment.

Petitioner

sustained

a

5%

whole

person

His prior impairments totaled 75%, resulting in a

total combined whole person impairment of 80%. (R. at 38-47).
All parties agree that the Petitioner is presently permanently
and totally disabled.

(R. at 61) . The Utah Industrial Commission,

however, found that Mr. Abel's "industrial accident was not a
sicrnif icant cause of his permanent total disability"

[emphasis

added], and that he was "basically unemployable on March 22, 1989
by virtue of his preexisting disabilities."
at 120) .

[emphasis added] (R.

Petitioner was awarded benefits for only the 5% whole

person low back impairment. (R. at 64, 121).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
4

Mr. Abel sustained a compensable industrial injury on March
22, 1989, while in the employ of Respondent West Jordan Care
Center.

Although he was at that time receiving Social Security

total disability compensation, Mr. Abel re-entered the work force
and was gainfully employed.

He had been working for several weeks

prior to his injury. The doctors who examined and treated Mr. Abel
found that he had sustained an industrial injury and that it was
responsible, at least in part, for his resulting permanent, total
disability status.

The Medical Panel appointed by the Industrial

Commission concurred. Mr. Abel was unable to return to work after
the accident, and was not a suitable candidate for vocational
rehabilitation.
The fact that one has been found by the Social Security
Administration, under their statutes, rules and definitions, to be
"totally disabled" does not mean that one can not still engage in
gainful employment.

In fact, the Social Security Administration

regulations allow and encourage a totally disabled person to return
to work, and if such return is successful and sustained, the person
is then removed from total disabled status. The receipt of federal
disability benefits does not as a matter of law preclude a worker
who

subsequently

returns

to work

and

is there

injured

and

completely disabled from also receiving state workers compensation
benefits.
This

Court

should

summarily

reverse

the

Industrial

Commission's determination that Petitioner's industrial injury was
not the precipitating cause of his "permanent, total disability"
5

status.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER.
Few

principles

of workers' compensation

law

are

as well

established in this State as that workers' compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of the claim.

Utah

Courts have consistently

principle from 1919 to the present.
796 P.2d

676

(Utah

1990);

reiterated

this

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,

State Tax

Commission v.

Industrial

Commission, supra.,; J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission,
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra. ; Baker v.
Industrial

Commission,

405

P.2d

613

(Utah

1965);

Askrew

v.

Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

in Chandler,

supra

at 1021-1022,

discussed the proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
x
employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other, should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. (Emphasis added).
In analyzing the record below, this Court should keep this
fundamental precept of workers compensation law in mind.

In doing

so, it becomes abundantly clear that the final agency action must
be reversed

and

remanded

with

instructions to enter

an award

granting permanent, total disability compensation benefits to Mr.
Abel.

7

II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FAILED TO AWARD
PETITIONER PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION DUE
TO PETITIONERS INJURIES WHICH WERE OCCASIONED BY HIS
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
The basis for the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion
for Review was their conclusion that "We determine that since
Applicant had already been determined to be permanently and totally
disabled, his current injury could not and was not, a significant
cause of his permanent total disability." (R. at 120).

In reaching

that conclusion the Industrial Commission adopted the findings of
the Administrative Law Judge that:
.•.The applicant's current unemployable status is not the
result of the March 22, 1989 accident.
Although the
March 22, 1989 industrial accident may have minimally
contributed to the applicant's already substantial
disabilities, that accident did not cause him to go from
employable to unemployable. The applicant was basically
unemployable on March 22, 1989. Although he was able to
work on a very limited basis (part time) at that time,
for very minimal wages ($3.42/hour) , he was not capable
of gainful employment due to his significant pre-existing
disabilities.
The applicant did not enter the job
market, only to be taken out again by the industrial
accident. Even the applicant stated that he took the job
at West Jordan Care Center, not as an attempt to return
to gainful employment, but rather as a way of becoming
more useful and active. ...the fact remains that he was
out of the job market when he began work there, he was
incapable of gainful employment at that time, and he was
permanently totally disabled as is evidenced by his 1985
Social Security Disability award.
The March 22, 1989
industrial accident did not cause the permanent total
disability. The disability was evident even before the
applicant began work with the Care Center. (R. at 63).
It is difficult to determine how the Administrative Law Judge
and the Industrial

Commission reached

the conclusion that the

Social Security determination was conclusive and that Mr. Abel was
not engaged in gainful employment.
8

It should be noted that under

Social Security Rules and Regulations, one can be totally disabled
and still be allowed to engage in gainful employment and earn up to
$740.00 per month. 20 C.F.R. 404.430.

That policy is further

recognized by Social Security's "Unsuccessful Work Attempt11 (UWA)
policy contained in Social Security Ruling No. 84-25.

(R. at 16-

19).
In

fact,

the

permanent, total

1988

statutory

disability

statute

modification

to

specifically

the

adopted

Utah
the

federal sequential evaluation process, which such process includes
a review of an injured worker's ability to return to substantial,
gainful

employment

with

due

acknowledgment

being

given

for

attempted return to work efforts which prove to be unsuccessful.
This is particularly true and significant where the unsuccessful
work attempt is directly caused by a significant industrial injury,
as here, which effectively precludes the completion of an otherwise
successful return to work effort. Stated another way, but for the
industrial

injury,

the

Petitioner

may

have

been

able

to

successfully return to work.
The Worker's Compensation Act should not be construed in such
a way as to discourage seriously injured workers from attempting to
return to work as a matter of public policy.

In addition, such an

individual should not be denied the rights, benefits and protection
of Worker's Compensation insurance coverage which all employees
enjoy for the simple reason that they have significant prior
impairments.

Failure to accept this reasoning raises serious

questions concerning possible violations of the federal and state
9

guarantees of equal protection of the law.
Both

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

Commission engaged in improper fact finding.

and

the

Industrial

The actual Findings

of Fact portion of the Order as they relate to the March 22, 1989
industrial injury and it's relation to Mr. Abel's permanent, total
disability status are grossly inadequate and do not meet recent
legal requirements.

The statements that Mr. Abel was out of the

job market and not gainfully employed are bald assertions, with no
reference to the evidence presented.
not constitute proper fact-finding.

Such summary conclusions do
In the recent case of Adams v.

Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Court stated as
follows:
While the purported 'Findings of Fact' written by
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred....
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the
Commission accepted one version over another.
The
evidence shows several possible configurations and
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes,
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact
occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of
the possible subsidiary findings.
The findings are
therefore inadequate. Jd. at 20.
The Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted
by the Industrial Commission are deficient in that they fail to
address in detail the issue of medical causation.
10

Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law
Judge, dispute that Petitioner is presently permanently and totally
disabled,

the

Industrial

Commission

does

not

address

the

Petitioner's inability to perform even the limited work he was
doing before his industrial injury.

The Administrative Law Judge

spends a great deal of time summarizing and discussing Petitioner's
prior medical problems, but does not make concise findings as to
Petitioner's current medical condition, the causes for it and the
ability of the Petitioner to perform any work in light of the
industrial

injury.

That

failure

manifests

itself

here

in

inadequate findings.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

recently

informed

this

Commission that:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' Jd. (quoting Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d

330, 335

(Utah App.

1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The Industrial Commission's as well as the Administrative Law
Judge's purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to
enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached.
11

Failure to

do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial.
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68

Grace

(Utah App.

1989) .
It is important to note that the Petitioner is not seeking to
recover twrice for the same disability; rather he only seeks Utah
W o r k e r s Compensation benefits for the incremental

loss of the

minimal wage he was able and in fact was earning at the time of his
industrial injury.

An award of partial disability compensation

does not fully compensate him for his total inability to work due
to the final 5% impairment he sustained in his industrial injury.
The March 22, 1989 industrial injury was the "final straw"
which rendered Petitioner incapable of performing any gainful work,
including, significantly, that which he was performing at the time
of his industrial accident.

Prior to that time and despite his

other impairments, which had led Social Security to conclude that
he was totally disable under its guidelines, he was nevertheless
capable of some gainful employment, although not full time work, at
the time of the industrial injury as

demonstrated by the fact that

he had been working for several weeks and was performing his duties
in an acceptable manner.

The fact that he was able to work is

evidence that he was not previously "permanently, totally disabled"
for purposes of Utah's Workman's Compensation benefits.

Marshall

v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984); Entwistle v.
Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981); and Nuzum v. Roosendahl Constr.
& Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977).
12

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(5)(b) (1988), in fact,
provides in significant part that permanent, total disability
compensation "...ends with the death of the employee or when the
employee

is

capable

of

returning

to

regular,

steady work".

(emphasis added). The Petitioner's industrial injury precluded him
from reaching the point where his work effort could be considered
"regular, steady work", but he was when he was injured attempting
to reach that possible plateau. The Utah Workers Compensation Act
should not be interpreted as discouraging return-to-work efforts
similar to Mr. Abel's.
The Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Petitioner
"was out of the job market when he began work (at the West Jordan
Care Center)" was incorrect because he was working at the time.
The fact that he was capable of gainful employment was demonstrated
by the successful discharge of his job requirements at the time of
the industrial injury.

The Administrative Law Judge erred as a

matter of law when she held that part time work for $3.42 per hour
is not gainful employment - it is work and that is all the Act
requires.

The motivation for working need not be exclusively

economic.

One who earns a wage at a job taken primarily in order

to be "useful and active", is still entitled to permanent, total
disability benefits, if injured on the job.
To deny permanent, total disability benefits in this limited,
minimal benefits claim would be contrary to the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act's policy of encouraging injured workers to return
to work.

As such, it contravenes basic public policy.
13

In addition, the lesser standard of entitlement, referred to
in the legal literature as the "odd lot" doctrine, is applicable
and unquestionably met in this case.
found

to

be

totally

disabled

Specifically, a worker may be

if by reason

of the

disability

resulting from the Petitioner's injury, he cannot perform work of
the general character that he was performing when injured, or any
other work which a person of his/her capabilities may be able to do
or learn to do.
(Utah 1984).

Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208

Brundaqe v. IML Freight, Inc., 622, P.2d 790 (1980).

Clark v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 604 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1979).
United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah
1964).

Caillet v. Industrial Commission, 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936).

The Petitioner clearly meets this standard for entitlement.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its March 27, 1992
Order dening Mr. Abel's claim
benefits.

for permanent, total

disability

He was gainfully employed, working 32 hours a week at a

lawful wage at the time of his injury. The uncontroverted evidence
submitted to the Industrial Commission supports the finding that he
sustained

a

accident, and

permanent

impairment

is permanently

industrial injury.

and

due

to

totally

his

1989

disabled

industrial
due to his

He was never able to return to work thereafter.

Despite his Social Security disability status, he was permitted and
able to work.

As a result of his industrial injury, he can no
14

longer work.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award
him permanent, total disability benefits.
DATED this 11th day of December, 19#2.

VIRGI
Attorney
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Mr. Darrell F. Abel
8155 South 1700 West #128
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988).
Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-17.

EXHIBIT B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(October 3, 1991).

EXHIBIT C:

Order Denying Motion for Review (March 27, 1992).
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Rehabilitation. (Last amended 1991)
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission
shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R.
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of.the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week,
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage,
rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through
35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks-at
the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection
(2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer
or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid
out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to?*the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable
permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section
35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings
have occurred:
^
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee.
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the
EXHIBIT A

employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands,
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah
1988 Second Special Session)

R568-1-17. Permanent Total Disability.
A. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a
finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use of the term
"substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its
findings relative to permanent total disability. The Commission does not
interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the
Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative
and not final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been
accomplished.
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee
has made, or is in the process of making, a determination of disability under
the foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of
instituting the process on its own behalf.
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has
qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will
determine if a significant cause of the disability is tjie claimant's
industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or causes.
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the
Commission shall rely upon and be guided by the rules of disability
determination published by the Social Security Administration Office of
Disability publication SSA Pub. No. 64-014, as amended. In short, the
sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of questions
and evaluations to be made in sequence. These are:
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in
Appendix 1 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014?
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her
previous work?
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total,disability, the
applicant shall be referred to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for
evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable to do any other work
because of his age, education, and previous work experience, and as a result
of an industrial accident, there shall be a hearing to review the
determination of the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation and anv obiections
thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing.
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the
Commission shall issue an order finding or denying permanent total disability
based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the
vocational factors in combination with the residual functional capacity as
detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014.
KEY:
1990

workers1 compensation, time, administrative procedure, filing deadlines
35-1-1 et seq.
35-2-1 et seq.
35-10-1 et seq.
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FUND,
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HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 12,
1991 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present
Virginius Dabney, Attorney.

^nd

was

represented

by

The defendants were represented by Mark Dean, Attorney.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie
Boorman, Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits
related to a March 22, 1989 industrial back injury. The carrier, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, and the Employers Reinsurance Fund have denied
liability for permanent total disability benefits, because they argue that the
applicant's permanent total disability status is not the result of the March
22, 1989 back injury. They point out that the applicant was found to be
disabled by Social Security in 1985, at least 4 years prior to the industrial
injury.
Therefore, they argue that the applicant's current disability is
primarily related to physical impairments that developed prior to the 1989
industrial injury. The applicant argues that he was able to return to work in
1989 not withstanding his significant medical problems and disabilities and
that it is the 1989 industrial back injury that has caused him to be currently
unable to work at any job.
Because all of the applicant's physical
impairments had not been rated at the time of the hearing, the matter was was
referred to a medical panel to obtain ratings for the applicant's
pre-existing, industrial and overall impairment.
It was felt that those
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ratings would assist in analyzing the cause of the applicant's current
disability status. The medical panel report was received at the Commission on
September 3, 1991 and was distributed to the parties on September 9, 1991 with
15 days allowed for objections. No objections were filed and thus the matter
was considered ready for order on September 24, 1991.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
I.

Medical Problems and Work History Pre-datinR the Industrial Injury
A.

Right Hand Amputation

The applicant had two operations amputating his right hand in 1965.
The amputation was necessary as a result of an industrial injury that occurred
when the applicant was cleaning out a punch press and the brake on the press
gave way. The operations occurred on February 22, 1965 and March 8, 1965 at
Providence Hospital in Oakland, California.
The only records that are
contained in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l) regarding the right hand
injury are the two operative reports (Tab A-12, pp. 58-64). The applicant
worked for another 20 years following the amputation and per his own
testimony, he was able to accommodate the loss of the hand very well.
B.

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD)

Chronologically, the first mention in the medical record exhibit
regarding this problem is the applicant's admission to Valley West Hospital on
August 7, 1983 for chest pain (Tab A-ll, pp. 53-56). The records for that
admission indicate that the applicant was smoking 2 packs of cigarettes per
day and had a family history of heart disease. The applicant was coughing and
had chest pain that radiated to his neck with numbness radiating down his left
arm.
Lab studies and an ECG were performed and he was treated with
nitroglycerin, oxygen and other medications. The final clinical impression
was: 1) chest pain probably due to pericarditis, 2) acute bronchitis and 3)
old orthopedic injuries. The next records most likely associated with this
problem are diagnostic tests done at Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, in
January and February of 1985. On January 11, 1985 a chest X-ray was taken and
was read to show probable pulmonary fibrosis (Tab A-14, p. 117). An EKG was
done on January 18, 1985 (Tab A-14, p. 97-98) and pulmonary function tests
were done on February 11, 1985 (Tab A-14, p. 118). Dr. G. Woods did an
evaluation of the problem for Disability Determination Services on March 14,
1985 (Tab A-14, p. 120). He notes that the applicant continued to have chest
pains after his 1983 hospital admission. Per Dr. Woods, severe pains occurred
during and just after coughing spells, with the pains disappearing several
minutes after the coughing stopped. There was no chest pain associated with
exertion, but shortness of breath occurred with exertion initially and had
progressed to occur while the applicant was at rest as well. The shortness of
breath was variable per Dr. Woods1 s report, with some days of shortness of
breath while resting and some days where the applicant was able to tolerate
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mild exertion. Dr. Woods notes that the applicant was coughing every morning
and has been a one-to-three packs-per-day smoker for 33 years. The applicant
coughed uncontrollably at intervals during Dr. Woods's examination. Dr.
Woods's assessment was: 1) chest wall painf EKG does not show changes
significant for coronary disease, 2) chronic bronchitis, not under optimal
medical therapy and smoking 1 pack per day, 3) positive PPD.
The applicant continued to have intermittent hospitalizations for
exacerbations of his chronic bronchitis* He was admitted to Holy Cross Jordan
Valley Hospital on March 18, 1985 (Tab A-7, pp. 37-38), on March 19, 1986 (Tab
A-7, pp. 33-36) and again on January 23, 1987 (Tab A-7, pp. 26-30). The
January 1987 admission was complicated by a hypersensitivity reaction to
sodium metabisulfite, a common green vegetable preservative, which occurred
after the applicant ate some celery. The hospital records indicate that the
preservative was known to cause airway obstruction in sensatized individuals.
The records for both the March 1986 and the January 1987 admissions note
continued heavy smoking. A July 22, 1987 medical report of Dr. K. B. Johnson
indicates that the applicant's condition was moderate to severe chronic
pulmonary obstructive disease, severe enough to require home use of oxygen
(Tab A-14, p. 149). The records contain two additional admissions to
Cottonwood Hospital for exacerbations of the applicant's lung condition.
These occurred in January of 1988 (Tab A-10, pp. 48-50) and in September of
1988 (Tab 1-10, pp. 45-47). The applicant testified that he smoked for 45
years and that at one point he smoked 3 packs per day. He stated that he
currently smokes 1 pack per day.
C. Essential, Familial or Intentional Tremor
Chronologically, the first mention of this tremor in the medical
record exhibit is found in a report of Dr. G. Woods dated May 6, 1985 (Tab
A-14, p. 106). In that report, Dr. Woods indicates that the applicant's
respiratory condition had improved with outpatient therapy, but that the
applicant felt he was unable to work due to a resting tremor in his head and
hand.
Dr. Woods notes that the tremor made tasks involving fine motor
coordination difficult and that the tremor had increased as a result of
bronchodilator medication the applicant was using. Dr. Woods recommended a
neurological consultation regarding the tremor. The applicant was evaluated
by Dr. D. Thoen of Western Neurological Associates in Salt Lake City on May
28, 1985 (Tab A-14, pp. 95-96). Dr. Thoen notes that the applicant had had
the tremor in his arms for a number of years, with the left being worse than
the right. He notes that the tremor had slowly gotten worse. Dr. Thoen found
that, as a result of the tremor, the applicant had a very difficult time
writing and would have difficulty manipulating small objects. He found that
the tremor became more severe when the applicant was agitated or when he was
concentrating on doing something. Dr. Thoen concluded that the applicant's
respiratory problems precluded use of the only medication that is known to
help the problem (Inderol). The applicant testified that this tremor did not
prevent him from being a truck driver.
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D.

Diabetes

The applicant has adult-onset diabetes which he testified was
diagnosed 8 years ago. The applicant began treatment for his diabetes in
February 1989 at the Family Medical Center in West Jordan, Utah. It is
unclear what treatment he had for the diabetes prior to that. The applicant
was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital on February 22, 1989 for "diabetes
mellitus out of control." Initially, there was consideration of insulin
therapy, but the applicants blood sugar was stabilized by way of diet and
medication and he was discharged on February 23, 1989 with the indication that
insulin would be avoided at that point. The discharge summary (the only
record in the medical records submitted) for that hospitalization indicates
that the applicant's diabetes mellitus was poorly controlled due to many
factors including, recent upper respiratory infections with bronchitis, lack
of diet therapy, prior prednisone use and underlying continued tooth
abscesses. The applicant testified at hearing that he controls the diabetes
with medication and diet and he is not currently insulin-dependent. The
applicant testified that he has some eye problems as a result of the
diabetes.
E.

Cervical Spine

The first mention in the medical record exhibit regarding treatment
for this condition is a Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital emergency room visit
on September 29, 1986 (Tab A-7, p. 31). The only note on the record for this
visit is that the applicant was given a cervical collar for neck pain. A CT
scan of the cervical spine was done at Holy Cross Hospital on November 12,
1986 (Tab A-14, p. 150). The scan report indicates that the film was
difficult to read due to the applicant's short neck and broad shoulders.
There did not appear to be significant stenosis of the bony spinal canal, but
the film was read to show some apparent narrowing of the intervertebral
foramen on the right of C6-7 and • slight narrowing of the intervertebral
foramen on the left at C5-6. Dr. K. B. Johnson found that the applicant had
diffuse degenerative joint disease, most marked in the cervical spine (Tab
A-14, p. 149). The applicant testified that he has headaches sometimes as a
result of his neck condition and he indicated that he was given a neck brace
at some point by some doctor.
F.

Other conditions

The applicant mentioned he had been in an automobile accident in the
past and had broken his collar bone, but it is not clear when this occurred
and there are no records for the relevant treatment. The applicant stated
that he had a water retention problem at one point in the past, but that this
resolved itself (no records regarding any treatment for this are included in
the medical record exhibit).
The applicant had chronic left epididymal
orchitis and as a result had a left orchiectomy and vasectomy performed at
Cottonwood Hospital by Dr. G. Middleton on November 14, 1985 (Tab A-10, pp.
51-52). The applicant testified that he takes medication for his cholesterol.
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G.

Work History

The work history provided by way of testimony is fairly general in
nature and dates were not provided. The applicant testified that he worked
for 20 years as a truck driver, driving dump trucks and 18-wheelers. The
applicant worked as a punch press operator in the 1960fs and this is when he
lost his right hand. Per the Social Security records, the applicant worked as
a nurse at th VA Hospital from 1975 through 1980 and then was employed for
approximately 2 months in 1980 at West Jordan Care Center taking care of
retarded children. From June of 1980 through July of 1984, the applicant
drove a delivery truck for Ireco Chemicals. The applicant was also employed
as a security guard beginning in December of 1984. The applicant originally
applied for social security disability in early 1985 under a primary diagnosis
of status post right hand amputation. He was denied on that application and
he reapplied with a primary diagnosis of severe familial tremor, left upper
extremity and secondary diagnosis of amputation right forearm. The applicant
was granted benefits based on that application in 1987 with the benefits
beginning as of January of 1985. The applicant was apparently unemployed from
1985 until he got his job with the defendant West Jordan Care Center shortly
before his injury in March of 1989.
II.

The Industrial Injury and Treatment Following that Injury

The applicant is a male who was 56 years old on the date of injury
(March 22, 1989). The applicant had his wife and hi^ wife's son living with
him on that date. On the date of injury, the applicant was employed with West
Jordan Care Center as a trainer/nurse*s aid. In that position, he was earning
$3.48 per hour working 32 hours per week. The applicant testified that he had
been receiving Social Security Disability benefits for 5 years when he got the
job at West Jordan Care Center. The applicant stated that under the Social
Security Disability system, a disabled person is allowed to work and earn a
certain amount of money. The applicants wife was working as a trainer and
she told the applicant about the job at West Jordan Care Center. The
applicant indicated that he did not like being unemployed with nothing to do
and thus he decided to take the job. The job involved dressing, feeding and
bathing the residents of the Care Center.
The applicant attended a
orientation meeting in which the new trainers were told what would be expected
of them. The applicant testified that he felt that he could do the necessary
work.
On the date of injury, the applicant was moving a resident from his
wheelchair to his bed. The resident was a mentally retarded adult (18 to 20
years old) named Kelly who weighed between 110 and 115 pounds. The applicant
had to get Kelly out of the wheelchair and up onto the bed (which was about 2
feet higher than the seat of the wheelchair). The bed was to the left of the
applicant and behind where he was standing. The applicant turned quickly as
he lifted Kelly and as he did so, Kelly began to move around. This caused the
applicant and Kelly to fall to the floor. The applicant testified that he
felt a sharp pain in the low back one or two inches below the belt line and he
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also felt pain in his legs for a couple seconds. The applicant managed to get
Kelly into the bed, but he recalls that his back hurt as he did this. The
applicant stated he turned in an accident report after getting Kelly into bed
and he went home. The applicant did not return to work after that because he
was unable to lift residents after the injury.
The applicant recalls seeing Dr. R. Davis at the Family Medical
Center in West Jordan the day following the injury (March 23, 1989). However,
Dr. Davis*s records indicate that the applicant was first seen for his
industrial back injury on March 24, 1989.
The records indicate that
medication was prescribed and the applicant received heat and ultrasound
therapy on March 24, 1989, March 28, 1989 and March 30, 1989. The applicant
had just one heat/ultrasound treatment in April of 1989 (on April 5, 1989),
but the applicant was treated at the Family Medical Center for his diabetes
and removal of a foreign body in his left hand in April of 1989. In May of
1989, the applicant was given 8 heat/ultrasound treatments at the Center and
he was also treated for a leg injury, diabetes, hypertension and knee pain
that month. At the Family Medical Center, the applicant saw Dr. R. Davis, Dr.
A. Jacoby, Dr. D. Hartmann and Dr. A. Rivera apparently alternately. The
applicant testified that he was referred to the Burns Chiropractic Center by
Dr. Hartmann in late May of 1989. Lumbar X-rays were taken there on May 23,
1989.
It is unclear from the records what treatment, if any, was provided
thereafter.
On May 31, 1989, the applicant was referred, to Western Neurological
Associates for a CT scan of the lumbar spine. The scan was read to show very
little facet degeneration with no evidence of disc herniation or fracture. It
is unclear what treatment, if any, the applicant got during June of 1989.
There are no records for June of 1989 in the Family Medical Center
information. In July of 1989, the applicant began again with heat/ultrasound
treatments for the low back at the Family Medical Center. He had 13
treatments that month at the Center and he was also seen there for his
diabetes. In August of 1989, the applicant had 18 heat/ultrasound treatments
for the low back at the Family Medical Center. On August 11, 1989, he was
referred for a second CT scan of the lumbar spine. The Holy Cross Jordan
Valley Hospital scan was read to show mild degenerative changes without
evidence of focal herniated disc disease. From August 15, 1989 through August
24, 1989, the applicant was involved in testing for a functional capacity
evaluation at Jordan Valley Physical Therapy Rehabilitation and Sports
Medicine. The conclusion reached by the evaluator was that the results were
invalid due to loss of the applicant's right hand and the back and leg pain
that the applicant was having during the testing. On August 24, 1989, the
applicant had an MRI of the lumbar spine done at Utah Neurological Associates,
but a report from that MRI is not included in the medical records. On August
31, 1989, Dr. R. Davis wrote the carrier indicating that the applicant had
developed lumbar spine dysfunction and myofascitis due to an industrial injury
and that he was 80% disabled from his current job and needed retraining.
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In September of 1989, the applicant had 16 heat/ultrasound treatments
at the Family Medical Center and he was also seen there for his diabetes. On
September 25, 1989, the applicant was seen by Dr. E. Spencer at the request of
the carrier. Dr. Spencer diagnosed the applicant as having mild degenerative
disc disease with hip abductor weakness and referred pain to the lateral
thighs and back. Dr. Spencer opined that the applicant had more of a muscle
strain than a disc injury and he found that the applicant had 0% impairment
resulting from the injury with no future medical care required for the
industrial
injury.
In October of 1989, the applicant received 23
heat/ultrasound treatments at the Family Medical Center and he was also
treated there for a upper respiratory tract infection, diabetes, bursitis and
otitis.
On October 24, 1989, Dr. J. Zahniser of Western Neurological
Associates wrote Dr. Jacoby at the Family Medical Center, apparently offering
a neurological consultative opinion. Dr. Zahniser read the lumbar CT and the
MRI (apparently the one taken on August 24, 1989 at Western Neurological
Associates) as normal and he concluded that the applicant had chronic low back
pain associated with musculoskeletal abnormality. He states in his report
that he agreed with Dr. Davisfs myofascitis diagnosis and he found the
applicant should seek non-lifting employment. On October 26, 1989, Dr. R.
Davis wrote a letter to whom it may concern indicating that the applicant's
back was not stabilized and the applicant was not released to return to work.
In November of 1989, the applicant got 16 heat/ultrasound treatments
to the low back at the Family Medical Center and he was also treated there
that month for asthma, pneumonia, diabetes and otitis^ On November 16, 1989,
Dr. Davis completed a summary of medical record form indicating that the
applicant had a 15-20% permanent impairment to the low back with none of it
pre-existing the March 22, 1989 industrial injury. The applicant continued
with his heat/ultrasound treatments from December 1989 through April of 1990,
getting approximately 20 treatments per month during that time period. The
applicant was also treated at the Family Medical Center for renal
insufficiency, high cholesterol, diabetes, upper respiratory tract infections,
insomnia, urinary tract infections, bronchitis and prostatitis during the
December 1989 through April of 1990 time period.
In May and June of 1990, the applicant cut back his heat/ultrasound
treatments to 11-12 treatments per month. From July of 1990 through October
of 1990, the treatments again were around 20 per month. The applicant was
seen regularly at the Family Medical Center for his diabetes and he was seen
episodically for urinary tract infection, prostatitis, cholecystitis, asthma,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and upper respiratory tract infection.
In November of 1990, he began regular treatment at the Family Medical Center
for hypertension. Beginning in December 1990, the applicant cut back his
heat/ultrasound treatments to around 10 per month and this continued through
March of 1991. Although the number of visits for heat/ultrasound after March
of 1991 are difficult to assess, the applicant continued with these treatments
fairly regularly.
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In March of 1991, the applicant was seen by Alan Heal regarding
rehabilitation.
When interviewed, the applicant indicated that he had
constant low back pain with frequent right leg pain to the foot. The
applicant indicated to the evaluator the he believed that his condition would
not improve. The applicant indicated that he could sit for one hour and that
standing and sitting cause his legs to go numb. The report indicates that the
applicants shortness of breath caused him to be unable to be in certain
environments, that his diabetes caused problems for him reading and that his
hand tremor caused writing to be difficult. Alan Heal concluded that the
applicant could do some kind of work, but was not fit for competitive gainful
employment.
In March of 1991, both Dr. R„ Davis and Dr. A. Rivera of the
Family Medical Center provided letters indicating that the applicant was
disabled due to his back and a number of other medical problems. Dr. Davis
opined that the applicant had a 15-20% disability due to the lumbar condition
alone.
At hearing, the applicant indicated that he still had constant low
back pain and stiffness that was worse at times. He stated that his legs go
numb to the knee at times and go out from under him. The applicant stated
that he still took soma and oxycodeine and that he could not sit or stand for
long. The applicant stated that he uses a cane to walk and that he did have
some back braces that he used just after the date of injury. He indicated
that future surgery is not recommended for him due to his lung condition. The
applicant stated that he considers his back to be his most serious medical
problem. The applicant stated that this is because fie was able to work (at
West Jordan Care Center) with his other medical problems, but could not work
after the March 22, 1989 industrial injury. The applicant considers his
diabetes to be the second most serious problem employment-wise, because it
prevents him from being a truck driver or a chauffeur and prevents him from
being able to do the charting that is necessary for nursing. The third most
disabling condition the applicant finds is his chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease which he finds prevents him from moving around in a hurry for a long
time. The applicant feels he can do none of the prior jobs that he has had
and he stated that currently he is not very active. He stated that when he
spoke with Rehabilitation (apparently the State Office of Education) they told
him that because of his age, it would take too long to retrain him to do light
work.
The appointed medical panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. M. Thomas, a
neurologist and Dr. B. Holbrook, an orthopedist. The panel was asked to rate
the applicant's numerous medical conditions. The panel rated as follows:
MEDICAL PROBLEM

WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT

right hand amputation
at the wrist

57%

chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD)

50%
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essential or familial tremor
di abet es

MiM

cervical spine

dX

low bacik

i1'.

thoracic spine

.'"X

orchidectomy
i ight cJ a i/i cle
cardiac

15%

meralgia paresthetica
The panel found
March 22, 1989
manner that: is
Impairment, the
whole person.

that only the low back impairment (5%) was attributable to the
industrial accident. Combining all the percentages, in the
required bj the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
panel arrived at a total combined impairment of 80* ~* *-v,~

I! ONCI .USIONS OF L AW:
There is no question that the applicant is permanently totally
disabled.
The applicant meets the Social Security guidelines for total
disability, which guidelines have been adopted in Utah by statute (U.C.A.
35-1-67) and by ri ile (R490-1 17) for 1 .lie purpose of analizing permanent total
disability workers compensation claims.
The issue to be resolved in this
case is whether the permanent total disability was caused by the March 22f
1989 industrial accident. If so, the applicant :i s entitled to an award of
permanent total disability benefits, if not, his permanent total disability
claim must be dismissed (R490-1-17 (C) and Larse v. Industrial Commission, 758
P 2d 954 (Utah App. 1988).
In analizing the cause of the applicants permanent total disability,
t lie applicant argues that his low back condition is the medical problem that
most effects his employability. He points out that he was able to work as a
trainer/aid at the care center prior to his back injury, and now, because of
his low back symptoms, is unable to do that job. He argues that he was able
to work at the care center with over 75% whole person impairment and so that
pre-existing impairment cannot be considered the cause of his disability.
Rather, he points to the March 22, 1989 back injury as the "final straw" which
made him unable to return to any kind of work. The ALJ finds the applicant's
argument logical and not without merit. However, the ALJ finds that the
arguments for no causal connection between the industrial injury and the
permanent total disability are al so very compel 1 ing.

ORDER
RE: DARRELL ABEL
PAGE TEN
The applicant was determined to be permanently totally disabled by
Social Security as of Jaunaury 1985. As noted above, the same criteria used
by Social Security in making a finding of total disability is now used by the
Industrial Commission in determining whether an applicant is permanently
totally disabled for purposes of workers compensation.
Therefore, per
Industrial Commission statute and rule, the applicant qualified as permanently
totally disabled in January 1985, 4 years prior to when he had the industrial
accident at issue (March 22, 1989). If the industrial accident occurred after
the applicant was already determined to be permanently totally disabled, then
it is very difficult to say that the March 22, 1989 industrial accident CAUSED
the permanent total disability.
Besides looking at the sequence of events, the ALJ finds that it is
also advisable to review the applicants disabilities and the causes of those
disabilities. In doing so, the ALJ notes that the applicant's most serious
employment disabilities do not necessarily correspond to the permanent
impairments that carry the highest percentage rating. For example, the right
hand amputation was not a serious employment disability for the applicant, in
and of itself, even though it rates 57% whole person. The applicant worked
productively for many years when this was his only major impairment. However,
when this impairment was combined with the development of the chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease in 1983 and the familial tremor in 1985, the
applicants employment disabilities became significant. The applicant was
precluded from employment that was exertional in nature, as well as from any
sedentary work that required fine motor skills, and i£ was at this point that
Social Security found the applicant totally disabled.
Currently, the applicant states that he feels his back problems are
the major cause of his inability to work, but the ALJ finds that the evidence
does not support this feeling. The applicant's back has not been operated on
and there have been no significant radiological findings which would suggest
that any acute injury to the back occurred on March 22, 1989. The panel feels
that the back has very minimal impairment and that the physical therapy
passive modalities that the applicant has received for the back over a period
of several years are probably not necessary. The applicant has indicated that
he has many symptoms that can be associated with low back injury, like
numbness in the legs and inability to sit or stand long, but it is not clear
that all these symptoms are related to the industrial accident. The panel
indicates that the applicant's leg numbness is a separate condition known as
meralgia paresthetica and that this condition is not related to the industrial
accident. It simply is not clear whether the limited sitting and/or standing
are due to the leg numbness or result due to the industrial accident.
However, even if one concedes that the industrial accident caused some
limitation to the applicant's ability to sit and stand over long periods, he
should still be able to do some kinds of light or sedentary work. What
prevents him from doing this kind of work is his pre-existing impairments and
their associated disabilities (inability to do sedentary manual work due to no
right hand and the familial tremor that effects the left hand, impaired
eyesight due to the diabetes and the factors of age and lack of
training/education).
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light of the foregoing discussion, the ALT find*; thai Hie
applicant did have a compensable work injury on March 22, 1989 and he is
therefore entitled to workers compensation benefits associated with the low
back injury that resulted due to t .he accident
Based on the evidence
currently before the ALJ, this would include medical expenses and permanent
impairment benefits for a 5% whole person low back impairment. Howcsver, it
does not include permanent total disability benefits. The applicant's current
unemployable status is not the result of the March 22, 1989 accident.
Although the March 22, 1989 industrial accident may have minimally contributed
to the applicant's already substantial disabilities, that accident did not
cause him to go from employable to unemployable. The applicant was basically
unemployable on March 22, 1989. Although he was able to work on a very
limited basis (part time) at that time, for very minimal wages ($3.42/hour),
he was not capable of gainful employment due to 1 :i:i s significant pre (existing
disabilities. The applicant did not enter the job market, only to be taken
out again by the industrial accident. Even the applicant stated that he took
the job at West Jordan Care Center, not as an attempt to return, to gainful
employment, but rather as a way of becoming more useful and active. The
applicant should be commended for his decision to work at the care center
helping other disabled persons. However, the fact remains that he was out of
the job market when he began work there, he was incapable of gainful
employment at that time, and he was permanently totally disabled as is
evidenced by his 1985 Social Security Disability award. The March 22, 1989
industrial accident did not cause the permanent ,total disability.
The
disability was evident even before the applicant began work with the care
center.
Although the applicant is MOT entitled to an award of permanent total
disability benefits, he is entitled to medical expenses and permanent
impairment benefits as noted above.
The carrier has already paid a
significant amount in in medical expenses related to the treatment of the
applicants low back, and it is not clear whether outstanding expenses exist.
As this issue was not raised at the hearing, t .he ALJ wi 1 ] presume that there
are no denied medical billings at this time. If medical expenses are at issue
now or become an issue in the future, the applicant can file a separate
application for hearing regarding medical expenses
Based on the Commission
file, the carrier has not paid any permanent impairment benefits. The panel
found that the applicant has a 5% whole person permanent impairment due to the
March 22, 1989 industrial accident, and thus the carrier should pay 15.6 weeks
of benefits at $85.00 per week (average weekly wage of $111.36 x .667 = $74.28
+ $10.00 for 2 dependents = $85.00 when rounded off as required by U.C.A.
35-1-75) f or a total of $1,326-, 1)0
Attorney fees are figured per R490-1-7 at
20% of 1 .his amount or $26* o n
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent
total disability benefits associated with the March 22, 1989 industrial
accident is dismissed with prejudice based on failure to establish the
requisite causal connection between the industrial accident and the permanent
total disability.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, West Jordan Care Center
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay the applicant, permanent partial
impairment benefits at rate of $85.00 per week, for 15.6 weeks, or a total of
$1,326.00, for the 5% whole person low back impairment sustained as a result
of the March 22, 1989 industrial accident. That amount is accrued and due and
payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and
less the attorney fees to be awarded below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, West Jordan Care Center
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay all medical expenses incurred
as the result of the March 22, 1989 industrial injury, said expenses to be
paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this
Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, West Jordan Care Center
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for
the applicant, the sum of $265.20, as attorney's fees in this matter, said
amount to be deducted from the accrued aforesaid award of the applicant.
IT rs FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, aH<f, Unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
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The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant which was received on November 4, 1991 in the
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-3 2.
The applicant was previously found to be total 1 y disabled by
the Social Security Administratioi \ in 1985, and has been receiving
Social Security related disability benefits. After having worked
for several weeks at a part time job for minimal wages in a nursing
home on March 22, 1989, applicant injured his back, and now claims
that he should receive Utah Workers Compensation benefits for the
incremental loss of the wages he was earning at the time of his
injury, Applicant's Motion for Review, at 3 J
After a hearing, and after a medical panel had reviewed
applicant's case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the
applicant had a compensable work injury on March 22, 3989, and that
applicant was entitled to medical expenses, and permanent
impairment benefits for a five percent impairment to the low back.
However, she found that the applicant was not entitled to an award
of permanent total disability benefits since the applicant was
"basically unemployable on March 22, 1989" by virtue of his
significant preexisting disabilities, Order, ALJ, at 1 1.
The medical panel rated the following percentages of whole man
impairment for the applicant's preexisting conditions:
(1)
Amputation of the right hand in 1965- 57%; (2) pulmonary disease50%; (3) tremor- 5%; (4) diabetes- 5%; (5) cervical spine- 6%; (6)
thoracic spine- 2%; (7) esophagus- 0%; (8) hypertension- 0%; (9)
orchidectormy- 5%; (10) right clavicle- 2%; (11) cardiac- 15%; and
(12) meralgia paresthetica, bilateral- 2%. Report, Medical Panel
at 8.
The medical panel determined that: the March 22, 19 8 9
industrial injury did not medically aggravate a preexisting
impaired condition of the applicant. Report, Medic:- Panel at 9.
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With regard to the compensable low back injury on March 22,
1989, among others, the panel determined that infrequent
consultation would be required, and that emphasis should be placed
on a weight reduction program. Id.
The applicant contends that the ALJ erred by interpreting the
rules in such a manner that public policy was violated. That is,
the Workers' Compensation Act should not be construed in such a way
as to discourage seriously injured workers from attempting to
return to work. Applicant's Motion for Review, at 3. We do not
believe that the benefits awarded by the ALJ in this case
diminished the noble aim of returning injured workers to the
workplace.
In this case applicant was awarded his medical
expenses, cind a permanent partial disability of five percent.
In this case, applicant had already been found to be totally
disabled by the Social Security Administration before his most
recent injury. U.C.A. Section 35-1-67 (1953 as amended in 1988)
required the IC to adopt rules with regard to permanent total
disability that conform to the substance of the sequential
decision-matking process of the Social Security Administration under
20 C.F.R. The IC promulgated such rules in 1990 under R490-1-17.
Since the Social Security Administration determined that the
applicant was permanently and totally disabled in 1985, we can use
this information and are not required to reinstitute the process.
Id. at B. We are also obligated to determine if a significant
cause of the disability was the applicant's industrial accident or
some other unrelated cause or causes. Id. at C.
In applying U.C.A. Section 35-1-67, the rules implementing
this statute state that the Commission "is deemed to [possess] some
latitude ... in exercising a degree of discretion in making its
findings relative to permanent total disability." R490-1-17A (Utah
Admin. Rules 1991). We determine that since applicant had already
been determined to be permanently and totally disabled, his current
injury could not, and was not, a significant cause of his permanent
and total disability.
We therefore agree with the ALJ that the applicant's
industrial accident was not a significant cause of his permanent
total disability.
We further decide that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Oirder of the ALJ were correct in law and fact, and are
supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated October 3, 1991 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear a] ] costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for ap£ve^ls purposes.
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